This review describes medical and surgical care during the American Civil War. This era is often referred to in a negative way as the Middle Ages of medicine in the United States. Many misconceptions exist regarding the quality of care during the war. It is commonly believed that surgery was often done without anesthesia, that many unnecessary amputations were done, and that care was not state of the art for the times. None of these assertions is true. Physicians were practicing in an era before the germ theory of disease was established, before sterile technique and antisepsis were known, with very few effective medications, and often operating 48 to 72 hours with no sleep. Each side was woefully unprepared, in all aspects, for the extent of the war and misjudged the degree to which each would fight for their cause. Despite this, many medical advances and discoveries occurred as a result of the work of dedicated physicians on both sides of the conflict.
T
he Civil War was fought in over 10,000 places and was the bloodiest war in the history of the United States. Two percent of the population at the time (approximately 620,000) died during the confl ict ( 1 ) . More Americans died in the Civil War than in all other wars combined. As hard as it is to believe, these numbers may actually be an underestimate of the death toll, given that much of the data regarding deaths of Confederate soldiers was destroyed when Richmond burned on April 2, 1865. More recent estimates based on comparative census data put the fi gure closer to 752,000 ( 2 ) . Countless other soldiers were left disabled. Th e year after the war ended, the state of Mississippi spent 20% of its annual budget on artifi cial limbs for its veterans ( 3 ) .
Many misconceptions exist regarding medicine during the Civil War era, and this period is commonly referred to as the Middle Ages of American medicine. Medical care was heavily criticized in the press throughout the war. It was stated that surgery was often done without anesthesia, many unnecessary amputations were done, and that care was not state of the art for the times. None of these assertions is true. Actually, during the Civil War, there were many medical advances and discoveries ( Table 1 ) .
Twice as many soldiers died of disease during the war than in combat ( 3 ) . Th is was a marked improvement compared with the Mexican War (1846-1848), where there were 7 to 10 deaths Medical and surgical care during the American Civil War, 1861-1865 Robert F. Reilly, MD from disease for every death in battle. It was not until World War II that weapons killed more Americans than disease. Th e war left about 1 in 10 able-bodied Union soldiers dead or incapacitated, versus 1 in 4 in the Confederate Army ( 3 ).
WHY DID SO MANY DIE?
Soldiers died from two general causes: battlefi eld injuries and disease. Contributing factors to combat-related deaths were inexperienced surgeons; the lack of a coordinated system to get the injured off the battlefi eld quickly; wound infections, since sterile technique was not yet recognized as important; and battlefi eld tactics that did not keep pace with advances in weaponry. Contributing factors to disease-related deaths included poor sanitation and overcrowded camps; the ignoring of sanitation by line offi cers; inadequate pre-enlistment screening Performance of the first plastic surgery of recruits; poor diet; lack of immunity to childhood diseases; and few specifi c treatments for disease. Army Regulation 1297 set out criteria for preinduction physical exams:
In passing a recruit the medical offi cer is to examine him stripped; to see that he has free use of all his limbs; that his chest is ample; that his hearing, vision and speech are perfect; that he has no tumors, or ulcerated or extensively cicatrized legs; no rupture or chronic cutaneous aff ection; that he has not received any contusion, or wound of the head, that may impair his faculties; that he is not a drunkard; is not subject to convulsions; and has no infectious disorder; nor any other that may unfi t him for military service ( 4 ).
Th at was the requirement; however, the reality was that many exams early in the war were of poor quality. Governors needed to fi ll quotas, and examining physicians were paid per recruit. If you could walk, carry a gun, and had front teeth and a trigger fi nger, you could enlist. Front teeth were needed in order to tear open the cartridge containing gunpowder and the bullet. Dental care was poor in the 1860s, and this was a frequent cause of rejecting a recruit. It was the origin of the term 4F (missing 4 front teeth). Th e system was so poor that it is estimated that about 250 women served as soldiers during the war ( 5 ) . Th e quality of physical exams improved with the Civil War Military Draft Act of 1863, when fi nes and prison sentences were put in place for physicians who were derelict in their duties, resulting in many more recruits being rejected from service.
To better comprehend medical care delivered during this period, it is important to understand the medical infrastructure at the time. Th e fi rst medical school was established in the United States in Philadelphia in 1765. Th ere was no prerequisite preparation for admission, no entrance exam, and no state medical licensing boards. Medical school was 2 years in duration. In the fi rst year, lectures were given in two 4-month semesters. Th e second year was a repetition of the fi rst. Students did not have any clinical experience prior to graduation. Medical schools at the time were more like proprietary schools. Th ere was a large entrance fee and as a result very few students ever failed ( 6 ) . Th e Flexner Report was still 50 years in the future, which required 2 or more years of college and a 4-year curriculum. In 1862, there were only six colleges of pharmacy in the US. Most doctors prescribed, compounded, and dispensed their own medications.
Th e germ theory of disease would not be established until 1870 and Koch's postulates in 1890. Disease was thought to be a result of either direct or indirect infl ammation ( 7 ). Indirect infl ammation was thought to be caused by excess blood fl ow to a tissue, a theory promulgated by a prominent 18th-century physician, Benjamin Rush. Th is led to the concept that bloodletting might be benefi cial. By the time of the Civil War, bloodletting had largely fallen out of fashion.
Before the war, the United States had a peace time army of 16,000 soldiers. Th ere were 113 doctors in the army. At the start of the war, 24 went south and 3 were dismissed for disloyalty ( 8 ) . At the end of the war, there were over 12,000 doctors in the Union Army and over 3000 in the Confederate Army. Before the war, the largest military hospital was at Fort Leavenworth, which had 40 beds. Th e only hospital in Washington, DC, before the war was a two-story six-room building used to isolate smallpox patients.
Th e fi rst major battle of the war fought at Bull Run in Manassas, Virginia, on July 21, 1861, illustrates how woefully unprepared the Union was from a medical standpoint at the start of the war. Fortunately, at Bull Run, casualty fi gures were not large compared with future battles (North, 481 killed, 1011 wounded; South, 387 killed, 1582 wounded) ( 9 ) . Despite this, many problems were encountered. Th ere was no military ambulance corps. Ambulances were driven by civilians who fl ed when the fi rst shots were fi red. If they left the ambulances behind, healthy soldiers stole them to fl ee back to Washington, DC. Not a single wounded soldier returned to Washington, DC, in an ambulance ( 10 ) . Tragically, wounded soldiers remained on the battlefi eld for days, the fi rst two spent in the rain. Incredibly, Surgeon General Finley did not order medical supplies until after the battle was over.
ORGANIZATION OF BATTLEFIELD MEDICAL CARE
How medical care was delivered on and off the battlefi eld changed during the war. Early on, stretcher bearers were members of the regimental band, and many fl ed when the battle started. Soldiers acting as stretcher bearers rarely returned to the front lines. As the war evolved, stretcher bearers became part of the medical corps. At the battle of Antietam, there were 71 Union fi eld hospitals. As the war went on, these were consolidated. Th ere were ambulances here that were used to bring the wounded to temporary battlefi eld hospitals, which were larger, often under tents, and out of artillery range. Later in the war, patients were transported to large general hospitals by train or ship in urban centers. Th ese did not exist when the war began. Th ere was no military ambulance corps in the Union Army until August of 1862. Until that time, civilians drove the ambu lances. Initially the ambulance corps was under the Quartermaster corps, which meant that ambulances were often commandeered to deliver supplies and ammunition to the front. Jonathan Letterman set up his own ambulance corps in the East under General George McClellan. Medical directors chose all the soldiers for their services. Ambulances could not be used for other purposes, and only the ambulance corps was allowed to remove wounded from the battlefi eld. Letterman was responsible for a number of organizational improvements within the Army of the Potomac and was given a free hand by McClellan to implement them.
Large general hospitals were established by September of 1862 ( 11 ) . Th ese were in large cities, and soldiers were transported there by train or ship. At the end of the war, there were about 400 hospitals with about 400,000 beds. Th ere were 2 million admissions to these hospitals with an overall mortality of 8%. In the South, the largest general hospital, Chimborazo, was in Richmond, Virginia. It was built out of tobacco crates on 40 acres. It contained fi ve separate hospitals, each made up of 30 buildings. Th ere were 150 wards with 40 to 60 patients per ward. Th e census was as high as 4000. Th ey treated about 76,000 patients with a 9% mortality ( 12 ) .
COMBAT-RELATED INJURIES
Before interpreting the data regarding combat-related injuries, it is important to recognize limitations in the reporting. In order to be reported, a soldier had to be either transported to or make it back to a fi eld hospital, and this may have resulted in an underreporting of deaths from cannon fi re. As shown in Table 2 , most injuries resulted from the Minié ball invented by the French offi cer Claude-Etienne Minié in 1849. Th e Minié ball is a 0.58-caliber bullet that is slow moving and is made from soft lead. It fl attens on impact and creates a wound that grows larger as the bullet moves deeper into tissues. It shatters bone above and below impact and usually does not exit. Because of its relatively slow muzzle velocity, it brought bits of clothing, skin, and bacteria into the wound. Th e majority of gunshot wounds occurred in the upper and lower extremities, but the fatality rate from these wounds was low ( Table 3 ) . Only 18% of wounds were to the abdomen, but these were more often fatal from intestinal perforation in the preantibiotic era.
Commanders in the fi eld were also slow to adjust their tactics in keeping with advances in weaponry. In the Revolutionary War era, smooth bore muskets were accurate only up to about 50 yards and were diffi cult to reload quickly, making rapid repetitive fi ring diffi cult. However, newer rifl ed muskets in use after the fi rst year of the war were accurate up to 500 yards, and troops could easily fi re them at a rate of 3 times a minute and sometimes faster. In the Revolutionary War, men could charge a fi xed entrenched position with the possibility of success, whereas in the Civil War this same tactic was sure to fail. Th is was evidenced by the catastrophic failures of Picket's charge at Gettysburg in the East, and Hood's charge at Franklin, Tennessee, in the West. Six high-ranking Confederate generals were killed at the battle of Franklin, where over 1750 men died in a 5-hour period, with another 5500 wounded or captured ( 13 ) .
Perhaps the most famous example of a lack of appreciation for the improvement in weaponry by those in high command occurred at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. John Sedgwick was the highest ranking Union general killed in the war. While directing troop movements at Spotsylvania Courthouse, he scolded his men for dodging bullets from sharpshooters concealed in the distant woods. "I am ashamed of you dodging that way. Th ey couldn't hit an elephant at this distance" ( 14 ) . Moments later a bullet fi red from more than 500 yards struck him in the head, killing him instantly.
SURGICAL PROCEDURES
Th ree of every four surgical procedures performed during the war were amputations. Each amputation took about 2 to 10 minutes to complete. Th ere were 175,000 extremity wounds to Union soldiers, and about 30,000 of these underwent amputation with a 26.3% mortality. Th e further from the torso the amputation was carried out, the greater the survival ( Table 4 ) . As the war went on, it was noticed that if amputation was done within 24 hours, mortality was lower than if performed † "Hip" meant an amputation high on the femur, near the hip joint. "Thigh" usually meant an amputation near the middle of the femur, although sometimes the location was specifically described as "upper third" or "lower third."
after more than 48 hours. Only about 1 in 15 Union physicians was allowed to amputate. Only the most senior and experienced surgeons performed amputations. Th ese changes were put into eff ect because of the public perception that too many amputations were being performed. Amputations were not carried out using sterile technique, given that Lister's classic paper on antisepsis did not appear until after the war in 1867 ( 15 ) . Anesthesia was fi rst introduced in the United States in the 1840s. During the Civil War, it was used in over 80,000 cases. Chloroform was preferred because it had a quicker onset of action, could be used in small volumes, and was nonfl ammable. During the war there were only 43 anesthesia-related deaths. Anesthesia was fairly light (stage II) leading to the misperception that it was not being used.
Postoperative wound infections, when they developed, were a serious problem in the preantibiotic era. Laudable pus was thick and creamy (thought to be due to Staphylococcal infection) and associated with a better prognosis than malignant pus, which was thin and bloody (thought to be due to Streptococcal infection). Hospital gangrene was a peculiar type of necrotizing fasciitis that was fi rst seen in the larger general hospitals. It was probably a result of a Streptococcal infection since nurses taking care of these patients occasionally developed erysipelas, but the exact organism remains unknown. A large percentage of patients with it died (45%) ( 8 ) . Treatment was to dissect away dead tissue and inject the wound margins with bromine under anesthesia. Th e wound was then packed with a bromine-soaked dressing and the patients isolated in separate tents with a separate bandage supply. Nurses dressed these patients' wounds last and washed their hands in chlorinated soda between patients.
NONCOMBAT-RELATED DEATH AND ILLNESS
A variety of factors contributed to a high rate of noncombatrelated illness, including overcrowded and fi lthy camps. Latrines were often not used or were drained into drinking water supplies or not covered daily. Food quality was poor from several standpoints. It was poorly stored, poorly cooked, and lacked enough vitamin C to prevent scurvy. Th e Army of the Potomac eventually added a number of rules: camps had be pitched on new ground and drained by ditches 18 inches deep, tents had to be struck twice a week to sun their fl oors, cooking had to be done only by company cooks, all refuse had to be burned or buried daily, soldiers had to bathe twice a week and change clothing at least once a week, and latrines had to be 8 feet deep and covered by 6 inches of dirt daily.
Th ere were few useful medications at the time, and about two thirds of all drugs were botanicals. In 1860 Oliver Wendell Holmes stated at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Medical Society, "I fi rmly believe that if the whole materia medica, as now used, could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind,-and all the worse for the fi shes" ( 16 ) . Medications that were helpful included quinine for malaria, morphine, chloroform, and ether, as well as paregoric. Many others were harmful. Fowler's solution was used to treat fevers and contained arsenic. Calomel (mercurous chloride) was used for diarrhea. Mercury is excreted in high concentration in saliva. Th is led to excessive salivation, loss of teeth, and gangrene of the mouth and cheeks in some patients. Th ere were several famous cases of calomel toxicity. One involved Louisa May Alcott, the author of Little Women, and the second Carleton Burgan. He was one of the fi rst people to undergo plastic surgery in the United States. Dr. Gurdon Buck performed a series of fi ve operations using skin from his forehead to rebuild his cheek and side of his nose.
Physicians at the time had an extraordinary workload. Th e following was excerpted from a letter Dr. Daniel Holt wrote to his wife, Euphrasia:
You cannot imagine the amount of labor I have to perform. As an instance of what almost daily occurs, I will give you an account of day-before-yesterday's duty. At early dawn, while you, I hope, were quietly sleeping, I was up at Surgeon's call and before breakfast prescribed for 86 patients at the door of my tent. After meal I visited the hospitals and a barn where our sick are lying, and dealt medicines and write prescriptions for one hundred more; in all visited and prescribed for, one hundred and eighty-six men. I had no dinner. At 4 o'clock this labor was completed and a cold bite was eaten. After this, in the rain, I started for Sharpsburg, four miles distant, for medical supplies ( 17 ) .
Th e soldier's diet consisted of fresh or pickled beef. It was heavily salted and frequently needed to be soaked prior to cooking and was often spoiled. Salt-cured pork was often rancid and mostly fat. Coff ee and hard tack were staples of the diet. Hard tack was a large biscuit that was often dipped in coff ee to make it more palatable. Th ere was very little in the way of fresh fruits or vegetables. Desiccated vegetables were often substituted, but the process led to the loss of biologic activity of vitamin C and unfortunately to many potentially preventable cases of scurvy. Scurvy had been known to result from lack of fresh foods and greens in the diet based on an observation made by Johann Bachstrom in 1734. Th e case fatality rate of many diseases worsened as the war went on, perhaps as a result of malnutrition and dietary defi ciencies.
Th e most common sickness among soldiers was gastrointestinal disorders. Th ere were 711 cases per 1000 soldiers per year ( 18 ) . Th e rate was higher in the West, where sanitation was worse. Th e mortality rate of acute diarrhea and dysentery was 3 to 17 per 1000 per year, while that of chronic diarrhea and dysentery was 126 to 162 per 1000 per year ( 19 ) . Th ere were no cholera outbreaks.
Malaria was also frequent: 224 of every 1000 Union soldiers seeking medical treatment were diagnosed with the disease ( 20 ) . It was particularly common in southern states such as Arkansas and Mississippi. William H. Van Buren discovered in 1861 that quinine could be used prophylactically to prevent malaria. Southern states did not have a large enough supply to use it in this way. Although the cause of malaria was unknown at the time, it was known that its incidence could be reduced by locating camps away from stagnant water, sleeping in closed rooms, and sleeping on elevated ground or upper fl oors of buildings.
